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ABSTRACT 
The study examined the effects of Board Independence 
and Institutional ownership on Earning Management of 
Oil and Gas Marketing Companies in Nigeria. A total of 
Eight (8) Oil and Gas Marketing Companies was used, 
covering seven years period (2010-2016). Data for the 
study were extracted from the Firms’ audited annual 
reports and accounts of the companies. Modified Jones 
Model (1995) was employed for calculating 
discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings 
management. Moreover, independence variables are 
Firm size, and Audit Quality. Data was subjected to 
detailed analysis through descriptive and inferential 
statistics with help of STATA software. After running the 
regression, a robustness test was conducted for validity 
of statistical inferences. The result revealed that Board 
Independence and Ownership structure have no 
significant on Earnings management. It is therefore 
recommended that The SEC should come up with a 
bench mark as to the numbers of independent non-
executive directors in this Oil and Gas Marketing 
Companies should have on its board.  
Keywords: Earnings management, Board 
Independence, Ownership structure, Discretionary 
Accrual  
Introduction  
Earnings management is seen as an attempt by 
management to induce,  influence or manipulate 
reported earnings by using specific accounting 
method or changing methods, recognizing one-time 
non-current items, deferring or escalating expenses 
or revenue transactions or using other methods 
designed to influence short term earnings (Rahman, 
Muniruzzaman Sharif 2013). This practice, 
according to Levitt (1998) "causes an erosion in the 
quality of earnings, and consequently the quality of 
financial reporting will lose out to illusion". 
Earnings management is the practice of managerial 
actions that are reflected in a company's financial 
reports either to give the intuition of smooth 
periodic or annual earnings, to show high profits in 
a given year at the 'expense' of lowering reported 
earnings in the future or to show little profit in a 
given year so that in future years reported profits 
will be higher.   
The practice of Earnings management is a 
conscious attempt to arrive at a preferred level of 
earnings using different means (Bello, 2011). 
Earnings management can take many forms and 
include various deceitful actions as a result of 
managers’ use of opinion in financial reporting. 
Earnings management, however, involves the 
preparation of financial reports in accordance to 
what correlates with the effort of the managers, 
such as to improve the worth of the company and 
that of the accountants. The flexibility of the 
accounting regulations makes it easy for managers 
to manage earnings and this arises the doubt to the 
quality of financial reports (Okoye & Alao, 2008).  
Financial accounting reports are produced to 
confirm the true and fair position of dealings of 
business entities so that stakeholders and other 
users of such information can take conversant 
decision. However, current accounting practices 
allow a degree of choice of policies and 
professional judgment in determining the methods 
of measurement, criteria for detection, and even the 
definition of the accounting entity has given rise to 
deliberate non-disclosure of information and 
manipulation of accounting figures, thereby 
making the business to be more profitable (or less 
profitable for tax purposes) and financially stronger 
than it’s supposed to be. 
Global corporate scandals that took its toll with the 
collapse of prestigious companies like Enron and 
Worldcom (2001), reiterated the need for an 
investigation into the quality of financial reports 
and increased the clamoring for a better governance 
mechanism globally. Bowen, Rajgopal and 
Venkatachanlam, (2003) observed that accountants 
and financial managers have systematic 
deficiencies in complying with accounting 
standards and governance systems to produce 
financial information as such cook their accounts to 
suit either their needs or the need of their 
shareholders as the case may be.  
These issues has adversely affected so many 
developing economies such as Nigeria, in which 
many corporations where faced with setbacks due 
to capital market scandal which results in monetary 
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crisis in the economy, such scandal involve large 
companies such as African Petroleum Plc, Cadbury 
Nigerian Plc, and Lever Brothers Plc (Ajibolade 
2008). The insolvency of these giant corporations, 
stemmed from influencing earnings, due to 
dishonest and untruthful practices by the board of 
directors and weak Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms (Fodio 2013).  
Therefore, the recent global financial crises have 
emphasized the need of transparency in 
presentation of financial information. Managers 
used their control over the firms to achieve their 
personal objectives at the expense of stakeholders 
(Uwuigbe et al., 2012; Uwuigbe, 2013). Kang & 
Kim (2011) opined that management could 
influence reported earnings by making accounting 
choices or operating decisions discretionally. 
Therefore, the corporate scandals of earning 
management highlighted above is not dependent on 
a particular factor or an attribute of companies or 
firms’ characteristics, such as firm size, audit 
quality, board independence, institutional 
ownership, audit committee size, gender size, 
corporate governance e.t.c..  
Although, previous study examined the relationship 
between firm’s characteristics and earning 
management in developed countries such as Prity 
Kumari & Pattanayak  (2015), Amarjit Gill, Nahum 
Biger, Harvinder S. & Neil Mathur (2013), Jordan, 
Clark & Hames, (2010), Yang & Krishman, &  
kuang & Sharma (2013) most notably in the United 
States, Russia and France. There is a study that 
investigates the influence of board characteristics 
on the financial performance of listed deposit 
money banks in Nigeria (Odudu, James & James, 
2016).  Also, Atu, Atu, Enegbe & Atu, (2016) 
studied determinants of earnings management in 
Nigeria quoted companies. 
However, some in the existing literature found to 
have investigated the impact of firm structural 
characteristics and financial reporting quality of 
listed deposit money banks in Nigeria were 
Olowokure, Tanko, & Nyor, (2016) Bala & Kumai, 
(2015).  Ibrahim, Bala & Garba, (2015) are in 
agreement that Board characteristics are related to 
earning management of listed food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria. Empirical evidence from previous 
studies have shown that audit firm’s size is a 
fundamental strategy that can lead to cash based 
earning management in Nigeria companies 
(Uwuigbe, Ranti, & Bernard, 2015; & Okolie, 
2014).  
Man & Wong (2013) concluded that Board 
independence had a negative effect on earning 
management practices. Also, Raheel (2017) 
revealed that depict a significant positive impact of 
Institutional Ownership on Earnings management, 
which means that increase in institutional 
directorship will lead to increase in earnings 
management 
Literature has shown that there are little or no 
studies on the oil and gas industry in developing 
countries particularly in Nigeria, as the existing 
studies were only conducted in U.S.A, Russia and 
France. Thus, indicating that there is limited 
literature on the effect of board independence, and 
institutional ownership on earnings management in 
African particularly in Nigeria.  
The following research questions and objectives 
were developed in view of the above research 
problem: Does Board Independence affect Earnings 
Management of listed Oil and Gas Marketing 
Companies in Nigeria? And Does Institutional 
Ownership affects Earnings Management in listed 
Oil and Gas Marketing Companies in Nigeria? 
This study seeks to examine the effects of Firm’s 
Characteristics on Earnings Management of listed 
Oil and Gas Marketing companies in Nigeria. 
However, it is set to achieve the following specific 
objectives: To study the effect of Board 
Independence on earnings management of listed 
Oil and Gas Marketing companies in Nigeria. To 
determine the effect of Institutional Ownership on 
Earnings Management of listed Oil and Gas 
Marketing companies in Nigeria. 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the 
following hypotheses were developed:- 
i. Board Independence has no significant 
effect on Earnings Management of listed 
Oil and Gas Marketing companies in 
Nigeria. 
ii. Institutional Ownership has no significant 
effect on Earnings Management of listed 
Oil and Gas Marketing companies in 
Nigeria. 
II.  Literature Review 
Management normally make used of some 
strategies in achieving certain targeted earnings. 
Earnings management likely occurred where there 
are lack proper monitoring systems in place and 
some managers take opportunity of the flexibility 
of the accounting standards. The accounting 
standards and procedure have given managements 
the opportunity to use their own judgement in the 
application of the standards in preparing their 
records, for instance the estimation of depreciable 
value or changing depreciation methods and a lot 
more others. Management can decide on which 
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accounting standards to use that will favour the 
organization in managing the earnings towards the 
directions that are favourable to the firms 
Marinakis (2011).  
Levit (2003), “Earnings Management is a gloomy 
area where accounting is being perverted, where 
managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings 
reports the desires of management rather than the 
true financial performance of the company”.  
The definition above seems earnings management 
as a report of what they desire instead of the true 
statement performance of the company. The 
assumption is that managements have personal 
motives to achieve and it is on this basis that they 
report their earnings. For instance, if management’s 
incentive is tied to earnings then management will 
prefer to report higher earnings in order to earn 
higher incentives. 
Rahmani & Akbari (2013) identified the 
association of size of firm and capital structure 
with the management of earning in Iran. 90 firms 
were sample from the total listed firms on Tehran 
Stock Exchange and secondary data was employed 
over the period of 2008 to 2012. Discretionary 
accruals were used as proxy to determine the 
earning management using Modified Jones model. 
Total assets logarithm was used as tool for the 
computation of firm characteristics. Gearing ratio 
was used to measure the capital structure. The 
study indicated the significant positive effect of 
firm characteristics and capital structure on earning 
management. It revealed that the firms having the 
more debt therefore required watch dog to 
discourage the practices of earning management.  
 
Uwuigbe, Ranti, and Bernard, (2015) assessed the 
effects of firms’ characteristics on earnings 
management of listed firms in Nigeria and the 
findings revealed positive and significant 
association between firms size and earning 
management while Bassiouny, Soliman and Ragab, 
(2016) concluded that insignificant relationship 
exist between firm size and earning management. 
Audit committee plays an important role in 
monitoring management to protect shareholders’ 
interest (Hasan & Ahmed, 2012). The code of best 
governance practice in Nigeria requires that the 
committee should be largely independent, highly 
skill, competent and possess high degree of 
integrity. (Hasan et al. 2012).  
Audit committee has been explored in prior 
literature and how it relates to earnings 
management using various constructs of audit 
committee effectiveness such as size of the board 
(Yermack, 1996: Xie, Davidson & DaDalt 2003), 
composition and independence (Klein, 2002), audit 
committee meetings (Beasley, 2000), financial 
expertise of committee members (Kalbers & 
Fogarty, 1993), and financial motivation of 
independent directors (Chtourou, Bedard & 
Courteau., 2001). In the existing literature, 
(Hassan, 2011) observed that more attention has 
been given to financial expertise as a construct of 
board competence. 
III. Methodology 
The data is panel in nature and as such the study is 
cross-sectional; this is because several firms were 
observed over a period of seven years (2010–
2016). Both descriptive and inferential statistics 
was used to analyze data. Descriptive was 
employed in calculating mean, median, standard 
deviation, maximum and minimum values of 
samples data. Inferential statistics comprises of 
correlation and regression, correlation also used to 
determine the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables while regression was 
employed in testing the hypotheses of the study. 
Discretionary accruals was used to measure 
earnings management being the dependent variable 
while, board independence and institutional 
ownership served as proxies for measuring firms’ 
characteristics  
The population of the study consist of all the Eight 
(8) Oil and Gas Marketing Companies in Nigeria, 
specifically oil companies that are quoted on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange as at January, 2017. 
These companies engaged in oil marketing of 
petroleum products as well as oil and gas 
exploration and production. Therefore, all the oil 
marketing companies that are quoted on the NSE 
and produce financial reports during the period 
2010-2016 formed the population of the study. 
Secondary data was used. The source is mainly 
from audited financial statement of the oil and gas 
marketing industry and accounts for the period 
2010-2016. This comprises of income statements, 
statement of financial position, cash flow statement 
and Notes to Accounts. This sourced from Nigerian 
Stock Exchange FactsBook and Financial 
Statements of the companies. 
The data for this study was, properly coded and 
analyzed in other to obtain a meaningful report 
using Microsoft Excel. Descriptive and inferential 
statistics was used in analyzing the data collected. 
Descriptive statistics used in calculating mean, 
median, standard deviation, maximum and 
minimum of the variables. Panel Regression 
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analysis employed to determine the effect of 
independent variables (board independence and 
ownership structure) on dependent variable 
(Earnings Management). The STATA statistical 
software was used. 
Measurement of Variables 
Variable  Measuring tool 
Dependent Variable 
Earnings Management Discretionary Accruals Modified Jones Model 1995 
Independent Variables 
Board Independence (BI) A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors to total board members is above sample median, and 
zero otherwise. 
Institution Ownership (IO) The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total 
number of shares. 
  
Control variable  
Cash Flow from Operations 
(CFO) 
Cash flow from operations deflated by total assets 
Adapted from Authors 
This shows how the variables of the study measured. 
Dependent Variable:- The dependent variable in this study is earnings management and measured by using 
Discretional Accruals (DA). Accrual approach to earnings management adopted due to the fact that, the 
estimation of the scope of earnings management is better served with accrual models though the use of 
discretional line items is best used for accuracy in detection. Also, this approach makes it easier to manage 
earnings via credit sales than cash collections. In addition, it attempts to control for the endogeneity bias in the 
original. More so, according to Uwuigbe et al. (2014) and Uwuigbe et al. (2012), this approach is one of the 
most famous and most frequently used models to detect earnings management. Hence, the modified Jones model 
of estimating discretional accruals was used. According Modified Jones Model, this approach accruals can be 
computed by using the following formula.   
DA= TA –NDA 
Where;   
DA= Discretionary Accrual 
TA = Total Accruals which are equal to cash flow from operation minus Net Income. 
NDA = Non-Discretionary Accruals which may be computed at the end in the following way 
Total accruals/At-1 = a1 [   1       ] + a2 [change in Rev – Change in A/R] + a3 [ PPE  ] + ε 
                                         At-1 At-1               At-1 
Where: 
At-1 = is total assets at the end of year t-1 
Change in revenue:                 = is revenue in year t less revenue in t-1 
Change in A/R                        = is net receivable in year t less net receivable in year t-1 
PPE                                         = is gross property plant and equipment at the end of year t.  
a1, a2, a3                                 = are firm specific parameters 
t-1                                            = Time coefficient  
ε = firm specific discretionary portion of accruals  
The econometric model developed for this study comprises of the following equations: 
The econometric model developed for this study comprises of the following equations: 
Y = α + β1Xit  ………………………………………………………………………………………….(1) 
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DACit   = α + β1INSOWNit ….............................................................................................................(2) 
DACit   = α + β2BOARDINDit   ………………………………………………………..……………….(3) 
DACit   = α + β1INSOWNit + β2BOARDINDit  …………………………………………………...………………………………………….(4) 
DACit  = α + β1INSOWNit + β2BOARDINDit  +  β3CASHFit +εt ……..……. …………………………(5) 
Where  
α - is constant  
β1 – β5 are the coefficient of the independent variables 
ε - is the error term 
Y- Dependent variable 
X – Independent variables  
i = number of firms under observation 
t = time 
IV. Results and Discussion  
Robustness test was conducted in order to improve the validity of statistical inferences. Multicolinearity test:-
Since the study employs multiple regression model, the association between the predictor variables (dependent) 
is unavoidable. Where the association is highly correlated, multicolinearity exists. This is tested to see the 
possibility of its existence or otherwise. This is done using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance value  
Heteroscedasticity test:- The study deals with observations that constituted different sizes, some are in ratios 
while others in units, and that heteroscedasticity often occurs when there is a large difference among the sizes of 
the observations. For that, we run for Heteroscedasticity test, with the help of Breusch-Pagan test. 
This shows the summary of data. It includes mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. The average 
value of the data is known as mean, standard deviation is the average variation in the data. Summary also shows 
the smallest value (minimum) of the data as well as the largest value (maximum). Summary of the data statistics 
covering from the year 2010 to 2016 for the population of 8 oil and gas marketing companies listed on Nigerian 
Stock of Exchange. 
Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable  |          Mean      Std. Dev.        Min         Max 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          DA    |      -1.670668     5.174000   -2.600581    9.959810 
          BI      |       .6405498     .1165093          .4     .8333333 
          IO      |       .5495636     .1534184       .004531      .7439974 
       CASHF  |       .1119386     .1320294   -.2660351    .4900729 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Source: STATA Output 2017 
The Discretionary Accruals (DA) has been measured by using Modified Jones Model. The mean value of DA 
for the selected firms is negative -1.67060668 in million, whereas maximum value is 9.959810 million and 
minimum value is negative -2.600581 and Standard deviation captured is 5.170010.  
Board Independence (BI) has been measured by percentage of non-executive directors in the total board 
member. The mean value of Board Independence for the selected firms is 0.6405498, which means that on 
average 64% of the board members are non-executive directors, whereas maximum value is    0.8333333 which 
means 83%, standard deviation captured 0.1165093. The value of minimum is negative -4.   
Institutional ownership (IO) has been measured by percentage of shareholding held by institutions in the total 
shareholding of the selected firms. The mean value of Institutional Ownership for selected firms is 0.5495636 
which means that on average 55% of the shareholding is with institution, wherein standard deviation value 
captured 0.1534184. The minimum and maximum are 0 .004531 and 0 .7439974 respectively. 
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Cash flow (CASHF) has been measured by cash flow from operations deflated by total assets of the selected 
firms. The mean value of CASHF for selected firms is 0.1119386 which means that on average 11% whereas 
standard deviation value captured 0.1320294. The minimum and maximum are -0.2660351 and 0.4900729 
respectively. 
Correlation Matrix  
The correlation matrix was used to determine the degree of relationship between variables of the study. These 
associations among the variables of the study are presented in Table below. It gives the existence of relationship 
among the variables which can be either positive or negative. Value closer to 1 depicts that the two variables are 
highly positively related/effecting each other indicating multicollonearity. 
 
               |      DA      FSIZE       BI       AQ        IO    CASHF 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
          DA |   1.0000 
          BI  |  -0.2593   0.7928   1.0000 
          IO  |   0.1504   0.4693   0.4372   0.4431   1.0000 
       CASHF  |  -0.0869   0.2606   0.1557   0.2704   0.4150   1.0000 
  Source: STATA Output 2017 
The correlation matrix shows that DA has negative relationship with BI and CASHF which is    -0.2593 and -
0.0869 respectively which means that increase in Board Independence and Cash flow lead to reduction in 
earnings management. Moreover, there is positive relationship between DA with and IO with 0.1504 which 
means that IO lead to increase in earnings management and vice vers 
a, however the positive relationship between DA and IO is a little bit strong.  
It can be observed that the relationship between the independent variables themselves are not significant, an 
indication of absence of multicollonearity. This can be clearly observed from the two indicators (i.e. Tolerance 
value and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which are within less than 1 and less than 10 respectively. 
Regression Results 
VARIABLES POOLED EFFECT RANDOM 
EFFECT 
FIXED  
EFFECT 
ROBUST FIXED 
EFFECT 
 Coefficient 
DA 17,2091 
(4.4573) 
16.6489 
(4.9926) 
11.7274 
(6.8589) 
11.7274 
(2.2661) 
BI -17.3119** 
(10.2358) 
-23.8480** 
(11.5048) 
-29.1714** 
(14.5604) 
-29.1714*** 
(6.6648) 
IO 17.2543* 
(6.4278) 
13.9036* 
(8.2583) 
5.5937 
(13.6784) 
5.5937 
(16.4794) 
CASHF -15.2594 
(12.2632) 
-12.0036 
(11.8775) 
-7.3351 
(12.2248) 
-7.3351 
(6.3544) 
Breuch-Pagan 0.42   
Hausman Test  0.47  
VIF  2.0 
NOTE:- ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significant respectively.  
Value  in (    ) represent standard error 
Table reveals the regression result which was estimated using panel model. The study estimated pool, random, 
and fixed effect models. Also performed Breuch-Pagan and Hausman test to validate the appropriate results to 
be presented. The P-value of Breuch-Pagan test presented in shows that its significant at 5% which implied that 
the pooled is appropriate. However, given the fact that our data are panel, we proceeded with Hausman Test to 
decide between Random and fixed model of which one is appropriate. The P-Value of Hausman is not 
significant which implied that fixed is more appropriate. However, fixed model has a problem of serial 
correlation which is tackled with robust fixed effect model which is used for this study. 
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Regression Results (Robust Fixed Effect) 
Variables.                     Coefficient                           P-Values             
 C                                     11.7274                                 0.0001                                                     
BI                                  - 29.1714                                  0.003                         
IO                                      5.5937                            0.744                           
CASHF                            -7.3451                              0.286                           
 
R -squared                          0.1907        
Adjusted R-squared          0.1098       
Wald chi2                          18.38 
P > chi2       0.0025 
 
Source: STATA Output 2017 
 
Table presents the summary of regression result i.e Robust fixed effect. It reveals the coefficient of the 
dependent and independent variables with their p-values. The r-squared statistic result shows a value of 0.1907 
and an adjusted r-squared of 0.1098.  
Testing of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses One: Board Independence and Earnings Management 
H01: Board Independence has no significant effect on Earnings Management of listed Oil and Gas Marketing 
Companies in Nigeria. 
Summary of Board Independence and Earnings Management 
 
Variables.                     Coefficient                           P-Values             
BI                                  - 29.1714                                  0.003                         
Source: STATA Output 2017 
 
Also from the above table 4.7, it is obvious that there is negative and significant relationship between board 
independence and earnings management of oil and gas marketing companies in Nigeria with a p-value of 0.003 
and a coefficient of -29.1714, which is said to be significant at 5%. This indicates that board independence is 
negatively impacting on earnings management of oil and gas marketing companies in Nigeria and the 
implication of this result is that the more independent the board of directors of these companies is the better at 
reducing earnings management of oil companies in Nigeria. This therefore serves a justification of rejecting the 
null hypothesis formulated which stated that there board independence has no effect on  earnings management 
of oil marketing companies in Nigeria. This result is in agreement with that of Talbi, Omri, Guesmi and Ftiti 
(2015) did study to investigate the efficacy of board characteristics in restraining management’s earning 
management, whereby results showed that board independence played significant role in controlling earnings 
management.     
 
Hypotheses Two: Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management 
H02: Institutional Ownership has no significant effect on Earnings Management of listed Oil and Gas Marketing 
Companies in Nigeria. 
Summary of Institutional Ownership and Earnings management 
 
Variables.                     Coefficient                           P-Values             
IO                                     5.5937                                  0.744                          
 
Source: STATA Output 2017 
From the table 4.9 above, it shows a result of positive and no significant relationship between institutional 
ownership with earnings management of oil and gas marketing companies in Nigeria. From the p-value of 0.744 
and a positive coefficient of 5.5937, reveals that institutional ownership impact positively on earnings 
management. The implication of this result is that ownership by institutions may not serve as means of reducing 
earnings management and this therefore provides a basis for the non-acceptance of the null hypothesis 
formulated which stated that institutional ownership does not have effect on earnings management of oil 
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marketing companies in Nigeria. The findings above are also in line with that of Odudu et al. (2016) that foreign 
directors is significantly and positively correlated or influenced the earnings management.  
Finally, the model also revealed that the control variable, cash flow is negatively but not significantly related to 
earnings management of oil and gas marketing companies in Nigeria. From the p-value of 0.286 and a 
coefficient of -7.3351, it therefore signifies that the firms with high cash flows are even likely to be incapable of 
reducing earnings management of oil and gas marketing companies in Nigeria than the firms with less or lower 
cash flows.  
On the overall, the combined and overall impact of the firm characteristics on earnings management of oil and 
gas marketing companies in Nigeria is depicted on the model summary of the regression results. The Wald Chi2 
of 18.38 which is significant at 1%  (0.0000) reveals that the model is well fitted, while the coefficient of 
determination R2 of 10.98%, explains the individual variation of dependent variable (discretionary accruals) as a 
result of the changes in the independent variables. It can therefore be said conclusively that firms characteristics 
(firm size, audit quality, board independence and institutional ownership) and cash flow have combined 
predictive power of 10.98% in impacting on earnings management of oil and gas marketing companies in 
Nigeria, while the remaining 89.02% is accounted for by other factors which are not captured in the model used 
for the purpose of this study. 
V. Summary and Conclusions  
This section presents conclusions of the study. 
(i) The analysis also revealed that Board independence negatively impacted on earnings management 
of oil and gas marketing companies in Nigeria and the relationship between independent variable 
(BI) and dependent variable (DA) was significant. 
(ii) Institutional ownership impacted positively on earnings management and the relationship was not 
significant.  
Based on the findings and conclusion of this study, the following recommendations were made: 
i. It is recommended that concerned stakeholders and regulators can take measures to increase the 
percentage of non-executive directors, put restriction on CEO duality and formulate strategy to 
decrease institutional ownership in order to restrict earning management.    
ii.  It is also recommended that The Security and exchange commission should come up with  
a bench mark as to the numbers of independent non-executive directors in this Oil and Gas Marketing 
Companies should have on its board. This is seen necessary because of the impact of independent non-
executive directors will have in the operation of the business. 
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